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ABSTRACT 
Solid-state drives operate on a combination of technologies that create a barrier between the 
physical data being written and the digital forensics investigator. This barrier prevents the 
application of evidence verification methods developed for magnetic disk drives because the barrier 
prevents the investigator from directly controlling and therefore verifying that the underlying 
physical data has not been manipulated. The purpose of this research is to identify a period of 
inactivity where the underlying physical data is not being manipulated by wear-leveling or 
garbage-collection routines such that evidence can be reliably verified with existing hashing 
algorithms. An experiment is conducted on Samsung drives. The limitation of this method is it 
does not enable the verification of deleted data and will be one size of solid-state drives. The 
results show that after an hour and a half, the solid-state drives examined will produce the same 
consistently until ten hours. 
Keywords: SSD, verification, validation, chain of custody, solid-state drive 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Methods for forensics and storage techniques 
have been developed around the physical 
design of magnetic hard drives and the idea of 
evidence verification [11[2]. Digital evidence 
altered during an investigation can be ruled 
inadmissible in a court of law. Hard disk drives 
and older forms of storage have proven 
techniques to prevent changes to data [1]131[4] . 
It is also possible to provide evidence that a 
hard disk drive has not been altered using a 
hashing program. With these methods, digital 
evidence can be presented in court with little 
question of their integrity [2] [3]. 
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The design of solid-state drives has 
drastically changed from the design of hard 
disk drives and because of this, evidence 
verification procedures used for magnetic 
drives will need to be redesigned for use in 
solid-state drives [1]. A solid-state drive's 
storage medium has a limited number of writes 
before a section of the memory will fail , 
rendering the entire drive useless [1][2]. A 
component of the solid-state drive is the solid-
state drive controller that holds firmware used 
to increase the lifespan of the drive [l] . The 
solid-state controller's introduction has led to a 
wider adoption of solid-state technology, but it 
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has also complicated standards for digital 
evidence in forensics investigations [l ]. 
Previous evidence verification methods fail 
due to certain firmware processes within the 
solid-state drive controller. Users are not given 
the same level of control over solid-state drives 
as they are hard disk drives [11[2]. The 
mechanism to prevent changes in HDDs works 
because of the lack of a solid-state controller 
equivalence inside HDDs drive [4]. 
The research goal and question were 
identified by searching for solutions to the 
problems from solid-state drives that forensic 
investigators face. The research goal is to 
explore periods of inactivity in solid-state 
firmware processes, also known as 
housekeeping algorithms, that affect evidence 
verification. The research question is as 
follows. Can periods of inactivity be identified 
during which housekeeping algorithms of a 
solid-state drive 's controller does not affect the 
validation process done by digital forensics 
investigators using a court accepting hashing 
methodology? 
2. JVlETHOD 
The goal of this research is to contribute to 
digital forensics knowledge base in the areas of 
solid-state drives and evidence verification by 
finding solutions without physically altering 
the solid-state drive. This experiment used the 
quantitative experimental research approach 
where a problem had been identified, data was 
collected, and a hypothesis had been 
formulated and to be tested. The experiment 
was designed to observe one condition which 
was the length of time between the solid-state 
drive to reach a static state. The results were 
measured and stored using software and are 
relevant to the research goals. 
The purpose of this study is to identify if 
there is a period of inactivity where the 
validation process used by a forensic 
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investigator is not being manipulated by wear-
leveling or garbage-collection routines. The test 
has been conducted as a controlled experiment. 
A period of inactivity is defined as a time 
when the solid-state drive is not manipulating 
the underlying data. Inactivity is verified by 
hashing the drive and verifying the output. 
Based on Bell's experiment, any window of 
inactivity is most likely to be soon after the 
drive has been powered up therefore the test 
will only be repeated for two hours. 
The researcher used four consumer-rated 
solid-state drives with a capacity of one 
hundred and twenty gigabytes to one hundred 
and twenty-eight gigabytes for this experiment. 
As stated before, Samsung controls most of the 
solid-state market. Therefore, all the solid-state 
drives used were manufactured by Samsung 
varying in size between one hundred and 
twenty and one hundred and twenty-eight 
gigabytes. 
An environment was necessary to create a 
test bed to run consistent experiments on each 
solid-state drive. The environment consisted of 
one desktop computer, the necessary 
input / output devices for the computer, and 
four solid-state drives. Each solid-state drive 
was connected to the experiment computer 
directly through a SATA port. The experiment 
computer was installed with Ubuntu Server 
14.04.05 LTS operating system. After 
installation, the operating system was 
immediately patched with up-to-date software 
packages. The only additional software 
installed were VIM, a simple text editor and 
parted, a command line tool used to partition 
drives. A Linux operating system was chosen 
over Windows because Windows modifies 
system volume information on drives utilizing 
NTFS file systems which may issue write 
commands to the experiment drives. No such 
requirement exists on the Ubuntu operating 
system. During the experiments, data sent to 
the test drives was controlled by scripts. 
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The experiment began by connecting each 
solid-state drive tested to the experiment 
machine. The machine was then powered on 
and booted to the Ubuntu operating system. 
Each solid-state drive had both data and 
power cables disconnected and reconnected. 
This was done to remove the frozen status of 
the solid-state drives. Upon booting, an 
operating system issues an AT A Freeze 
command that prevents any security-related 
changes to the solid-state drives. Power cycling 
the test drives unfroze each drive and allowed 
the secure-erase command to operate properly. 
Four terminals were opened to execute the 
experiment scripts on each of the test drives. 
Each terminal was set to a different directory 
where the experiment script was copied. Each 
experiment script was then started and passed 
the path to a solid-state drive and the location 
of a unique mount point as parameters. The 
syntax to run the script at the command line is 
the following: 
. / main_ 1.sh <drive> <mountpoint> 
The script began by issuing the secure-
erase command erasing all contents the drive. 
The script then partitioned, formatted, and 
mounted the solid-state drives. By writing 
standard text files , the solid-state drives were 
then filled to ninety percent capacity, deleted 
to twenty-five percent capacity, and then filled 
to fifty-percent capacity. Upon completion of 
all file write and deletion, an MD5 hashing 
program was immediately executed for two 
hours on each solid-state drive. 
It should be noted that the solid-state 
drives never reached one-hundred percent 
capacity. It was considered rare in a real-world 
scenario that a user's drive would ever reach 
maximum capacity. The deletion of data 
created slack space which should cause 
garbage-collection and wear-leveling to be 
triggered. The process of writing, deleting, and 
writing files again was intended to ensure 
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every available cell of the test drive to be 
written to at least once and to have cells that 
are marked for deletion. Together, these scripts 
created a scenario that would trigger garbage-
collection and wear-leveling routines to 
activate. 
In total , the experiment was conducted 
four times. In the first two experiments, the 
MD5 hashing program executed for two hours. 
In the last two runs the MD5 hashing program 
executed for ten hours. The time for one 
experiment was originally estimated to take 
between two to three hours for each solid-state 
drive, totaling between ten to fifteen hours for 
all. The actual time for completion of four 
tests executed on four drives concurrently took 
between twenty-seven to twenty-nine hours. 
The detailed experiment steps are below. 
This experiment has eleven steps. Steps three 
through ten were implemented in scripts 
developed by the researcher. All scripts were 
run from the experimenter's machine . 
1. Experimenter's machine was powered 
on with four solid-state drives 
connected plus an additional magnetic 
disk drive that hosts Ubuntu 14.04.05 
lts operating system. 
2. The experimenter disconnected the 
power and data cable from each solid-
state drive from the machine and then 
reconnects both cables again. 
3. Each solid-state drive was wiped by 
being sent a Secure-Erase AT A 
command which defaulted the drive to 
its original, out of the box state. 
4. The script then paused until each drive 
completed the Secure-Erase. 
5. Each solid-state drive was then 
formatted with the NTFS file system. 
6. Each solid-state drive was logically 
mounted to the experimenter's system. 
7. Each solid-state drive was then written 
to ninety percent capacity. 
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8. The drives were written with files 
ranging from one byte to thirty-two 
megabytes in size from / dev/ urandom. 
9. Each solid-state drive had randomly 
selected files deleted until the drive 
reached twenty-five percent capacity. 
10. The deletion operation was a normal 
file-system deletion, like emptying the 
recycle bin of a windows operating 
system. 
11. Each solid-state drive was then written 
to fifty percent capacity. 
12. The drives were written with files 
ranging from one byte to thirty-two 
megabytes in size from / dev/ urandom. 
13. A script was run from the researcher's 
computer to produce an MD5 of the 
Table 1. 
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solid-state drive continuously for two 
hours. Each MD5 produced was stored 
on the computer for analysis along with 
the time taken to generate the MD5. 
14. Data was analyzed to identify periods 
of inactivity within the solid-state 
drive's garbage-collection and wear-
leveling processes. 
3.RESULTS 
The results are formatted in tables with the 
MD5 hash in the left column and the time 
taken to produce the MD5 hash in the right 
column. The time is formatted as 
minutes:seconds:milliseconds. 
Drive A 2 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 1 
# Hash Duration 
1 bac32beed77d6d8abf8638fc9a22134c 25:35.52 
2 b358d9a12daaa67085flc3b7f5bc79c8 24:43.11 
3 b358d9a12daaa67085flc3b7f5bc79c8 24:46.05 
4 b358d9a12daaa67085flc3b7f5bc79c8 22:43.24 
5 b358d9a12daaa67085flc3b7f5bc79c8 21:33.29 
6 b358d9a12daaa67085flc3b7f5bc79c8 15:53.90 
Table 2. 
Drive B 2 Hour MD5 Hash Outvut, 2, Exveriment 1 
# Hash Duration 
1 81e5f26cf86a339b640891344d252111 20:38.00 
2 14478f9c87d07333e2b094clae6b8e43 21:28.35 
3 7d7518901d13edc55bc7faf53c3dcld4 22:56.48 
4 7d7518901d13edc55bc7faf53c3dcld4 23:39.49 
5 7d7518901d13edc55bc7faf53c3dcld4 23:06.82 
6 7d7518901d13edc55bc7faf53c3dcld4 23:02.83 
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Table 3. 
Drive C 2 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 1 
# Hash Duration 
1 f6c0843420e90891d2c38ef218920a56 26:20.99 
2 a5187d990a919bfdec2004150fc7b71c 24:55.80 
3 a5187d990a919bfdec2004150fc7b71c 25:19.84 
4 a5187d990a919bfdec2004150fc7b71c 22:53.60 
5 a5187d990a919bfdec2004150fc7b71c 21:48.87 
Table 4. 
Drive D 2 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 1 
# Hash Duration 
1 f390b733f0e18d5c0ba9261e6d63475d 10:20.35 
2 e6dbfc25b51fbd8cb0205b8303d3583c 10:41.85 
3 e6dbfc25b51fbd8cb0205b8303d3583c 10:49.51 
4 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 11:07.67 
5 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 11:08.67 
6 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 12:18.61 
7 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 12:28.77 
8 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 11:38.91 
9 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 11:40.61 
10 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 11:33.02 
11 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 12:23.23 
As shown from the first experiment 's 
results, the hash became consistent after the 
third consecutive hash. When the same hash is 
produced consecutively, the contents of the 
drive are not being altered. These results imply 
there are periods of inactivity in the solid-state 
drive controller's housekeeping algorithms 
during which validation processes are not 
affected. 
Except for one solid-state drive, each drive 
reached a state where the hashes were not 
changing after the MD5 hash program 
executed once. The experiment was repeated a 
second time to validate the results of the first 
experiment. 
Table 5. 
Drive A 2 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 2 
# Hash Duration 
1 856002ae8684fc21fl bf5c82ef568128 20:38.97 
2 ed8e45e37d6a81aab0ac441e88187c45 22:47.51 
3 ed8e45e37d6a81aab0ac441e88187c45 22:22.07 
4 27764daaea24b2877db98fed10225c95 22:36.22 
5 27764daaea24b2877db98fed10225c95 22:02.87 
6 27764daaea24b2877db98fed10225c95 21:47.60 
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Table 6. 
Drive B 2 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 2 
# Hash Duration 
1 e189f3a8db0bfaf22fd4debcd36ee454 15:57.91 
2 4fef78663fb013d 43aa68070f d3f5c2c 15:52.62 
3 4fef78663fb013d 43aa68070f d3f5c2c 17:43.63 
4 4fef78663fb013d 43aa68070f d3f5c2c 21:02.38 
5 4fef78663fb013d 43aa68070f d3f5c2c 21:20.30 
6 4fef78663fb013d 43aa68070f d3f5c2c 20:56.44 
7 b56ee7e5e45b25011da4508be4d296ac 20:46.62 
Table 7. 
Drive C 2 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 2 
# Hash Duration 
1 585 7 40b343ff7 d932cl 55 77986fd 70ce 21:46.95 
2 c5605404931fc7de248495a87127476f 23:10.35 
3 c5605404931fc7de248495a87127476f 22:45.43 
4 9d 1 fee b5c68ccf2c2d982653 72cf944f 22:52.67 
5 9d 1 fee b5c68ccf2c2d982653 72cf944f 22:26.83 
6 9d 1 f cc b5c68ccf2c2d982653 72cf944f 22:47.63 
Table 8. 
Drive D 2 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 2 
# Hash Duration 
1 d7c6dd4c527b2339c74cf07a6alcfed6 15:53.15 
2 6fdl 9891 def04f0b9b009e88edcb 736c 15:53.49 
3 6fd19891def04f0b9b009e88edcb736c 17:40.12 
4 6fd19891def04f0b9b009e88edcb736c 20:55.82 
5 6fdl 9891 def04f0b9b009e88edcb 736c 21:18.84 
6 6fdl 9891 def04f0b9b009e88edcb 736c 20:56.35 
7 bdecd52de5aaff448471cblaef123455 20:48.63 
In the second experiment , Drive A and 
Drive C produced a consistent hash after four 
hashing iterations. These results match the 
first experiment's results. However, the results 
for Drive B and Drive D were different from 
the results in the first experiment, and Drives 
A and C in the second experiment. 
from these results that the wear-leveling 
and/ or garbage-collection could still run after 
entering a state of inactivity. Additionally, 
Drive A and Drive C only produced a 
consistent hash for three hashing iterations 
before the test ended. Drive B and Drive D 
had produced consistent consecutive hashes for 
longer but still allowed data to be altered at 
the end of the test. This may be an indication 
that Drive A and Drive C's wear-leveling and 
or garbage-collection could also activate after a 
period of inactivity. 
The last hash produced for Drive B and 
D was different from earlier hashes which 
could indicate that garbage-collection and 
wear-leveling routines were running again after 
a period of inactivity. Conclusions were drawn 
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Additional data was gathered to examine 
how often the hash changed for each drive. A 
second set of tests was conducted the same as 
the first tests, with the exception that the 
MD5 hashing program would execute for an 
additional eight hours changing the total 
execution time to ten hours. 
Table 9. 
Drive A 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 3 
# Hash Duration 
1 508267f0208523d00ba7f0372966fb79 19:57.9 
2 59a 7827176 lfb9f36b30fd68efe6a860 20:30.0 
3 lf84ca40ac124b71a57d021fa12a9e90 21:34.0 
4 191ObOffd7435d 4d82869961 efef7360 22:07.5 
28 191ObOffd7435d 4d8286996 l efef7360 20:25.9 
Table 10. 
Drive B 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 3 
# Hash Duration 
1 63b38a64b2ecaed4949d8db6320e9f48 15:24.1 
2 9b9b0ddfelf703d 7 c465c3539feb04ed 15:40.4 
3 9b9b0ddfelf703d 7 c465c3539feb04ed 17:40.8 
4 9b9b0ddfelf703d 7 c465c3539feb04ed 19:24.2 
5 9b9b0ddfelf703d 7 c465c3539feb04ed 19:13.8 
6 d72a2e1718d8a89c79da3e31ac8ab47e 21:07.5 
32 d72a2e1718d8a89c79da3e31ac8ab47 21:05.3 
Table 11. 
Drive C 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 3 
# Hash Duration 
1 0507b030bc15b96fe50f353efa3e2c55 20:40.1 
2 f730256327f8f4alf9e3e754aa36b32d 20:53.4 
3 0f1765678198327ad6327703dd953d70 22:25.2 
26 0f1765678198327ad6327703dd953d70 23:33.9 
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Table 12. 
Drive D 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 3 
# Hash Duration 
1 le2d732187a3ec427efcd3422felad7b 15:13.6 
2 8cca98ccla5634b7f033682d5b8f3e6a 15:37.6 
3 8cca98ccla5634b7f033682d5b8f3e6a 17:17.6 
4 8cca98ccla5634b7f033682d5b8f3e6a 19:23.2 
5 8cca98ccla5634b7f033682d5b8f3e6a 18:56.6 
6 d8ff920d43933fe2aef94fa532de5a3a 20:56.7 
30 d8ff920d43933fe2aef94fa532de5a3a 20:40.1 
Table 13. 
Drive A 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 4 
# Hash Duration 
1 6a5a93c167f797bd46a80de292fb324a 22:45.9 
2 8db0034679607 dfa8514444f2a01 bfce 23:44.0 
26 8db0034679607 dfa8514444f2a01 bfce 25:32.6 
Table 14. 
Drive B 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output Experiment 4 
# Hash Duration 
1 ee94482f39bca3f9244d9el 72bbccf7c 15:47.6 
2 b3cc0f055a8b34 7 e6b42f cff2f70113e 15:48.0 
28 b3cc0f055a8b34 7 e6b42fcff2f70113e 23:22.2 
Table 15. 
Drive C 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 4 
# Hash Duration 
1 f3bbdad1755465de46266fc33a92713a 12:23.1 
2 95a054dae1826fa8e01bff9ed45f0aa5 11:55.8 
49 95a054dae1826fa8e01bff9ed45f0aa5 14:52.9 
Table 16. 
Drive D 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output Experiment 4. 
# Hash Duration 
1 ff 49c215d6b597 dbb6fde20ce635335 7 15:42.2 
2 7705414505849254d18e29d096f12980 15:49.9 
49 95a054dae 1826fa8e01 bff9ed 45f0aa5 14:52.9 
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4. CONCLUSION 
Based on the results seen in Table 8 through 
Table 16, all solid-state drives tested produce a 
consistent hash when the experiment was 
extended from two to ten hours. Additionally, 
seven of the sixteen tests show an early period 
of consecutive, matching hashes may occur 
within minutes of the start of the analysis of 
the drives but change again within several 
hashing iterations. 
The research question is "can periods of 
inactivity be identified during which 
housekeeping algorithms of a solid-State drive's 
controller does not affect the validation process 
done by digital forensics investigators using a 
court accepting hashing methodology?" The 
data produced by the experiment above 
provides a strong indication that given an 
amount of time equal to or greater than one 
and a half hours, a solid-state drive will reach 
a state in which multiple matching hashes are 
generated and where the validation process for 
digital forensic investigators is not affected 
using these solid-state drives and firmware 
versions. 
These results have also produced data 
about the aggressiveness of the garbage-
collection and wear-leveling routines of solid-
state drives. The only variable changed during 
the experiments was the length of time the 
MD5 hashing program executed. However, the 
aggression and speed of the wear-leveling and 
garbage-collection routines are unpredictable in 
these experiments. Experiment three for Drive 
A showed the MD5 hashing program produced 
different hash five iterations in a row until 
reaching a state where consecutive matching 
hashes were produced, which only happened in 
one experiment. Drive A reached a state where 
consecutive matching hashes were produced on 
experiment three after one hour but reached 
the same state in experiment four after only 
twenty-two minutes. Additionally, Drive B 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
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showed a short , early consecutive matching 
hashes state in experiment three, but not in 
experiment four. 
The results indicate that there is a period 
of inactivity where the solid-state drive 
produces a consistent hash over a length of 
t ime that could allow an investigator to image 
the solid-state drive, verify the image, and 
power off the solid-state drive before the hash 
changes. However, allowing the drive to reach 
this period of inactivity before a forensic image 
is created causes data such as slack space to be 
lost and changes the drive from its original 
acquisition state. Presently, that is not within 
accepted forensic practices. New forensic 
practices should be reviewed to adopt this 
technique. If new chain of custody standards 
approved of this technique, investigators could 
use this technique to obtain evidence from a 
forensic copy that is close to the solid-state 
drive's original state. Currently, evidence 
obtained from solid-state drives is usually 
deemed inadmissible because solid-state drives 
are self-altering and self-corroding due to wear-
leveling routines and garbage-collection. 
When this research began, the goal was to 
investigate whether solid-state drives can reach 
a state that no longer interferes with the 
validation process used by forensic examiners. 
The research has identified a strong indication 
to support this hypothesis. The experiment 
wrote data mimicking a user's daily use in real 
environments, and then examined four solid-
state drives produced by the industry's leading 
producer of drives. The results of this 
experiment clearly show that a period of 
inactivity for garbage-collection and wear-
leveling routines was identified within the ten-
hour window; however, this period of inactivity 
has not yet been proven to be permanent. 
Further research and analysis is needed on this 
subject before a method can be published that 
allows forensic evidence to be examined and 
presented in court without question. 
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APPENDIX 
Drive A 
Model: SAMSUNG MZ7TD128HAFV-000L1 
Serial Number: S14TNSAD602536 
Firmware Revision: DXT04L0Q 
Drive B 
Model: Samsung SSD 750 EVO 120GB 
Serial Number: S33MNB0H949501E 
Firmware Revision: MAT01B6Q 
Drive C 
Model: SAMSUNG SSD 830 Series 
Serial Number: S0VUNY ABA0l 720 
Firmware Revision: CXMOlBlQ 
Drive D 
Model: Samsung SSD 840 EVO 120GB 
Serial Number: S1D5NSAFB67977M 
Firmware Revision: EXT0CB6Q 
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